Russian losses in the war with Ukraine.
Mediazona count, updated

In this update, the number of Russian officers killed in the war in Ukraine has surpassed 5,000. The average age of officers killed in action is lower than the overall average, and significantly lower than that of volunteers and mobilised soldiers. This reflects the early months of the war, when the fighting was largely carried out by career servicemen.

This week, we wanted to mention the work behind the database. The foundation of this reporting lies in a database built entry by entry, through the relentless efforts of journalists and volunteers. The work is meticulous and time-consuming: reviewing videos of memorial services, matching names and faces from grainy footage, verifying dates of birth and death, and identifying regional links. One typical session might involve confirming that a man memorialised in Krasnoyarsk krai also appeared in earlier data from Irkutsk krai—two large regions in Siberia—removing duplicates, correcting spellings, adding missing details. 

While some records arrive through local news or relatives’ social media posts, many now surface via state-organised events: school presentations, tree-planting ceremonies, or video tributes. These often serve propagandistic purposes, but they also offer crucial evidence. Volunteers carefully log them, noting where a photo was taken or what kind of plaque was installed. Every piece of information is archived: sources are preserved, so that links never vanish. 

Although parts of the process are semi-automated, the bulk of the effort remains manual. Our database’s original structure, intended to classify by military branch only, has had to adapt over time. Now it includes social categories like “convict” or “mobilised”, reflecting Russia’s shifting recruitment strategies. Each entry is checked, often more than once, by other contributors. 

This project was not designed to handle a death toll on this scale. In the early days of the invasion, we imagined it might include a few thousand names. Instead, it has now passed one hundred thousand. The psychological toll of this work is significant, with volunteers experiencing burnout, fatigue, and emotional numbness (not to mention the obvious legal risks). Even a single evening of data entry can be exhausting. Still, the work continues, because these records offer the most reliable account of the war’s human cost, in the absence of official transparency.

The Russian government continues to hide the true scale of its losses. This database stands as a rare reality check. For us, it’s an act of public accountability, both an archive and a form of resistance: a record not just of how many have died, but of who they were, and how their memory is being preserved, or erased, in the Russian public sphere.

What we know about losses

Here’s how the losses are distributed across Russian regions. These are absolute numbers, not adjusted for population or number of military units.

On the map, you can choose between total losses and losses by military branch, as well as see where the deceased mobilised soldiers were from.

In most cases, from death reports or indirect signs (uniform or sleeve patches in photos), it’s possible to determine which branch of the military the deceased served in, or how they joined the army (mobilised, volunteer, prisoner, etc.)

We compared these groups of servicemen on a separate graph.

From early summer and into the mid-fall season of 2022, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.

By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.

By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.

By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.

By April 25, the death of 5,000 officers of the Russian army and other security agencies had been confirmed.

The proportion of officer deaths among overall casualties has steadily declined since the conflict began. In the early stages, when professional contract soldiers formed the main invasion force, officers accounted for up to 10% of fatalities. By November 2024, this figure had dropped to between 2–3%—a shift that reflects both evolving combat tactics and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry, who suffer casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers.

Officers killed in Ukraine

To date, reports of the deaths of two deputy army commanders have been officially confirmed—Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky of the 41st Army and Major General Vladimir Frolov of the 8th Army.

On May 22, 2022, fighter pilot, 63-year-old retired Major General Kanamat Botashev died; most likely, he went to war as a volunteer. The deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, was also killed. On June 5, 2022, the death of Major General Roman Kutuzov was reported.

In June 2023, Major General Sergei Goryachev was killed. He was the chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army and commanded the repulsion of the Ukrainian counterattack in the Zaporizhzhia region.

In July 2023, the death of the first Lieutenant General was confirmed—Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District.

In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky was killed. He was the deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps.

In November 2024, Major General Pavlo Klimenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (former DPR ‘Oplot’ Brigade), died. According to the pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel Spy’s Dossier, he was fatally wounded on November 6: Klimenko was attacked by an FPV drone while riding a motorbike between command posts.

The date of death of servicemen is specified in nearly 84,500 reports. The number of losses per day according to this data hardly reflects the real picture, but it allows us to assume on which days the battles were the most intense.

It should always be taken into account that the data of the last few weeks is the most incomplete and may change significantly in the future.

Age is mentioned in nearly 91,200 reports. In the first six months of the war, when the regular army participated in the invasion without volunteers, mobilised soldiers, and prisoners, most deaths were in the 21–23 age group.

Volunteers and mobilised soldiers are significantly older: people voluntarily go to war at 30–35 years or older, and the mobilised are generally over 25.