Russian casualties in Ukraine.
Mediazona count, updated

Teams of OSINT analysts, who tally losses of military equipment, report that Russia has been losing a very large number of tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and artillery in recent weeks. However, this has not yet been reflected in our casualty counts based on obituaries.

Early in the war, when losses of military equipment were even more substantial, many analysts made a mistake: they assumed that if a tank was destroyed, for example, three people had died. We now understand that this is not the case. Firstly, many abandoned vehicles that are later destroyed are counted as losses. A hit on an armoured vehicle does not always mean the crew has been killed; footage from drones often shows soldiers being evacuated.

Russia’s heavy losses in equipment are frequently discussed, but the situation has indeed shifted in this direction. According to the Conflict Intelligence Team, there is at least a local shortage of armoured vehicles in the Russian army, with military forces resorting to using DesertCross golf carts and even motorcycles for assaults.

However, Russia still has thousands of tanks and other vehicles in storage. Teams of OSINT analysts are also monitoring the state of these storage bases by purchasing high-resolution satellite images and carefully counting each APC or artillery piece.

Nonetheless, our casualty reports barely reflect losses among tank crews and artillerymen. This is due to the overall trend of replacing professional soldiers with civilians—volunteers, convicts, and mobilised personnel. There are now significantly fewer professional soldiers among the dead, for whom it was possible to unambiguously determine where they served and to which branch of the military their unit belonged, compared to 2022.

The number of casualties we find on social media has remained roughly the same throughout 2024: around 1,200 people per week, most of whom, as mentioned above, were not professional servicemen. The only trend we can currently note is a significant increase in the number of deaths from Bashkortostan, a republic with a Bashkir ethnic minority that is governed by a former Kremlin political operative Radiy Khabirov and has seen massive protests in recent months. The region has now risen to second place in terms of casualties across Russia, surpassed only by the densely populated Krasnodar krai, where, additionally, there is a group of volunteers monitoring the graves of fallen soldiers (meaning we learn about a greater number of losses).

What we know about the casualties

The distribution of casualties across Russian regions is presented in absolute figures, these numbers have not been adjusted in relation to regional population sizes or the concentration of military units.

Readers can view either overall losses or those specific to different branches of the armed forces. Additionally, there is information regarding the native regions of the mobilised soldiers.

In most cases, the branch of service or the way the deceased ended up in the army (mobilized, volunteer, inmate, etc.) can be determined from the death reports or indirectly, through uniform or sleeve patches in photos.

We compared these groups of military personnel in a separate chart to provide a clearer picture of the distribution of casualties among different categories of soldiers.

Since the summer, volunteer units bore the brunt of casualties, a stark contrast to the war’s initial phase. During the winter and early spring, the heaviest losses were sustained by the Airborne Forces, followed by the Motorised Rifle Troops.

By the end of 2022 and entering the new year, there was a marked increase in fatalities among prisoners conscripted into the Wagner PMC. These conscripts were formed into “assault groups” for offensives against Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.

By March 2023, these prisoners represented the largest single category of losses in the conflict. Following the assault on Bakhmut, there have been no reported instances of mass deployment of these prisoner units.

As of January 19, the confirmed death toll among Russian army officers and other security forces exceeded 3,300, with 390 of these officers being of Lieutenant Colonel rank or higher.

Officers killed in Ukraine

As of today, official confirmation has been received regarding the deaths of two deputy army commanders: Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky of the 41st Army, and Major General Vladimir Frolov of the 8th Army.

In late May 2022, retired Major General Kanamat Botashev, 63, a former fighter pilot, was killed, presumably having volunteered for combat. Additionally, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, the deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, was also reported among the casualties. On June 5, 2022, the death of Major General Roman Kutuzov was reported.

In June 2023, the death of Major General Sergei Goryachev was announced. He served as the chief of staff for the 35th Combined Arms Army, responsible for confronting the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region.

By July 2023, the death of the first Lieutenant General, Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District, was confirmed.

In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky was killed. He served as the deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps.

Over 38,900 reports specify the dates of military personnel deaths. While the daily loss figures derived from this data may not accurately reflect the total casualties, they provide an indication of the intensity of the fighting on specific days.

It is important to note that the most recent data is likely to be incomplete and subject to significant revisions in the future.

In 42,200 of the casualty reports, the ages of the deceased are mentioned. In the initial six months of the conflict, characterized by the deployment of regular military forces without the inclusion of volunteers, mobilised troops, or prisoners, the most significant number of fatalities occurred in the 21–23 age group.

The age profile diverges notably for volunteers and mobilised soldiers. Those who volunteer for combat service are predominantly in the age bracket of 30–35 years or older. The mobilised personnel are generally over the age of 25.